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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
CLARK A. ROSS, NICHOLAS G.
SI-IAHEEN, HUGH V. BIRD, GLEN
vV. CROSBY, ELLIS A. SHAHEEN,
OTTO L. JORGENSEN and LARRY
W. BLAKE,
Plaintiff's,

-vs.-

PRODUCERS ~fUTUAL INSURANCE . No. 8394
COM:PANY, PRODUCERS FINANCE
COMPANY OF UTAH, WENDEL A.
DAVIS, RICHARD G. JOHNSON,
ERNEST A. RICHARDS, GEORGE R.
REEDER, DAVID A. RUSSELL and
NINA B. DAVIS,
Defendants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants were policy holders of the Producers
Mutual Insurance Co1npany, hereinafter referred to
throughout this brief as "Producers". Each of the
plaintiffs has lapsed his policy.
Appellants set out in their A1nended Co1nplaint that
Producers sold a life insurance policy deno1ninated
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''Founders Participating Policy", \vhich they advertised
as an "individual or family whole life policy", and as a
part of the plan of selling said policy they prepared an
application for the purchase of insurance to be attached
to the policy, and in connection with the sale of the
policy executed a Trust Agreen1ent which provided that
the purchaser of insurance should assign the dividends
fro1n the insurance to trustees "\Vho should use the dividends for the purchase of stock in Producers Finance
Company, a company to be for1ned. That in addition to
the premium on the policy, as set forth the1ein, each
insured paid a fee for life membership of $5.00. That
on Septe1nber 4, 1953, the Department of Business Regulation, through the Insurance Department, issued an
order to Producers to cease and desist within ten days
from selling shares of stock in connection with or as an
inducement to the sale of insurance. That an appeal
was taken fro1n the order to the Third Judicial District
Court where the order was upheld, and that thereafter
an appeal was taken from the judgment of the District
Court to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah where
the judgment of the District Court was affirmed. Appellants also allege nu1nerous other violations of the
insurance code - that there was discrimination in favor
of certain individual or classes, that the Founders Participating Policy is a five year term policy, instead of
a whole life policy as represented, that the premium
charged was excessive, that a major portion of the
excess was used in paying excessive salaries, commissions and expenses to officers and agents, and that Pro-
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ducers had failed to return the excess pre1niu1n collected.
The Amended Co1nplaint alleges as a final conclusion that by reason of the foregoing the Founders
Participating Policy and Trust Agreement executed in
connection therewith were null and void ab initio, and
that, therefore, plaintiffs are entitled to the return of
all premiun1s paid to Producers, together with interest.
To the foregoing Amended Complaint respondents
filed a Motion to Dismiss upon the ground that the
amended complaint does not state facts sufficient to
constitute a claim upon which relief can be granted.
The matter was argued to the Court, and the Court
entered an order that appellants' Amended Complaint
be dismissed. Appellant then asked for a re-hearing
and upon the conclusion of the re-hearing the Court
again granted the motion.
A third time the n1atter was heard with a. different
approach and with different argument presented by
appellants. The trial court again granted respondents'
motion. The discussion which took place bet"'~een Counsel for appellants, and the Court reflects the proceedings
in the trial court. The following quotations are from
pages 25, 26, 27 of the record:
"Mr. Draper: Just this one observation and I am
through. This matter was presented to
the Insurance Comn1issioner. He had a
plain duty to revoke their license and he
merely enjoined then1.
The Court: Well, I had that thought while you
were arguing. If this Company is violating these statutes, as you indicate, and it
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is the dutv of the Conunissioner to revoke
their licen.,se, or take son1e other penalizing
action against the1n, he has no discretion
about it and if you \Vere here for a writ of
mandate directing him to do it on a clear
cut situation there would be no question,
it seems to me, about it. Of course that
is another thing and isn't what seems to be
before me. All through your argument I
was impressed with the idea that this see1ns
to be a matter for the Commissioner. Now
seeing you have got, we will say, a violation
of ten or twelve statutes here it just makes
it all the more aggravated and arouses the
anger of the Court, or anybody that has
to pass on it. If that makes it bad where
is the violation' Is it after the violation
of one statute, or after the violation of
four or five, or a dozen. There would be
a line of demarcation there where the policy becomes void and the thing should be
declared so by the Court, or it should be
enforced by the Insurance Commissioner.
Mr. Draper: That is what happened in the Mountain States case. The Commissioner absolutely threw us out and continued to issue license to the company. The Supreme
Court revoked its licenses.
The Court: That is a thought on that case. It
didn't declare the policies void, either.
Mr. Draper: No, that wasn't asked for. The
whole matter was laid before the Commissioner. He has got those facts before
him. The matter was presented to him
and he starts an injunctive procedure. He
exceeds his authority in licensing this company.
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The Court: After all, it is his duty to license
these co1npanies. Now if you were here to
have a policy declared void that, of course,
is one thing. But just as "\Ve discussed in
other hearings, and I think Mr. Iverson
had ample authority on this 1natter that
these policies are not void. The violation
of the statute has its only penalty in the
suspension of the license, or revocation of
the license and I can see for the Court to
say these policies are void because they
violate ten or twenty statutes that certainly
isn't the answer to it.
Mr. Draper : The one statute said if they do discriminate in the·, 1nanner stated the policies
are invalid.
The Court: Mr. Iverson concedes that the provisions for the sale of stock are void. But
the thing you want to say, or want me to
say, is that these policies are void.
Mr. Draper: I keep saying this is 1ny last, but
if the statute says that a provision which
discriminates is invalid and the provision
says you must not sell stock with insurance
and you put those together how can there
be any insurance or any company at all if
you invoke the penalty of invalidity.
The Court: That is just the proposition. Where
is the line of demarcation between a valid
policy and a void policy in a statute which
carries its own penalty~
Mr. Draper: If the Co1n1nissioner has a clear
duty to declare it void and fails to do it
that is where the Courts con1e in.
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The Court: There is no duty about that and they
come in either by doing it themselves or
de1nanding through a writ. Well, I fail to
see any change in your position here from
what the case was to begin with. I think
it is a matter for the Insurance Commissioner so far as the regulation of this company is concerned, and I don't believe it
is my duty or any other court's duty to
declare these policies void because there
was one or numerous violations of this
statute. For that reason the defendant's
motion to dismiss will be granted and I
take it Mr. Iverson, that this pretty well
covers your other motion to strike, doesn't
it'"
ARGUMENT
The question \\ hich is decisive of this whole matter
is: Were the policies issued to appellants void ab initio~
All other questions involved in this case are important
only insofar as they contribute to the answer to this
question.
Appellants in their Brief have included many matters which are irnmaterial, and do not contribute to the
answer to the question above mentioned. Numerous
sections of the Insurance Code are cited, which from a
mere reading of the sa1ne make it apparent that the
violation thereof could not result in rendering the policies void. The only matters argued in Appellants' Brief
which could possibly affect this result are the matters
involving want of mutuality of the insurance contracts,
illegality thereof, the ultra vires nature thereof, or discrimination in the sale thereof.
7
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The respondents, therefore, will discuss this n1atter
on the following points:

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
ALLEGED VIOLATION·S OF NUMEROUS SEC·TIONS OF
THE INSURANCE CODE CITED BY APPELLANTS ARE
IMMATERIAL.
POINT II.
THE POLI·CIES OF INSURANCE ISSUED TO APPELLANTS WERE NOT VOID AB INITIO BECAUSE OF WANT
OF MU·TUALITY AND APPELLANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED
TO RETURN OF PREMIUM PAID ON THE GROUND OF
WANT OF MUTUALITY.
POINT III.
APPELLANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO RETURN OF
PREMIUMS PAID WITH INTEREST BECAUSE THE POLICIES ISSUED WERE ULTRA VIRES.
POINT IV.
THE POLICIES ISSUED ·TO APPELLANTS WERE NOT
VOID AB INITIO BECAUSE OF ILLEGALITY OR DISCRIMINATION AND APPELLANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED
TO RETURN OF PREMIUMS PAID UPON THE GROUND
THA·T SAID POLICIES WERE VOID AB INITIO.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
ALLEGED VIOLATIONS O·F NUMEROUS SECTIONS OF
THE INSUR.ANCE CODE CITED BY APPELLANTS ARE
IMMATERIAL.
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Appellants cite the following provi~ions of the Insurance Code and allege violations thereof: 31-1-11; 3127-22; 31-7-12; 31-19-24; 31-13-24; and 31-7-10. A rnere
reading of these sections will disclose that a violation of
any one thereof, or all taken together, would not affect
the policies sold to appellants or would not require the
court to declare the policies of insurance sold to appellants void ab initio. As a sample of such sections respondents cite the following:

Section 31-7-12:
"No person having any authority in the in~
vestment or disposition of the funds of a domestic insurer shall * * * be the beneficiary of any
fee * '* * or other emolument because of any investment, loan, deposit * * * or exchange made
by or for the insurer, or be pecuniarily interested
therein in any capacity."
Nor does it require any argument that the violation
of Section 31-19-18, quoted at page 25 of Appellants'
Brief could not have that effect. Said section is as follows:
"No insurer * * * shall make any contract of
insurance or agreement as to such contract, other
than is plainly expressed in the policy issued
thereon. Any such understanding or agreement
not so expressed shall be invalid."
It is obvious that the contract of insurance which violates
this section is not rendered invalid. It is only the understanding or agreernent not expressed therein which shall
be invalid. This provision is the common provision contained in so many contracts, that any understanding or
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agreernent not contained therein shall not be binding upon the parties. However, such an agree1nent does not
invalidate the rnultitude of contracts which contain this
prOVISIOn.
Certainly the policy would not be rendered void by
reason of any violation of Section 31-19-24, set forth at
length at page 26 of Appellants' Brief as follows:
"(2)

No person shall wilfully collect as prerniu1n
for insurance any sum in excess of the
amount actually expended or in due course
is to be expended for insurance applicable
to the subject on account of which the
premium was collected.

" ( 3)

The excess collected shall be returned to
the person entitled thereto within a reasonable length of time.

4)

Each violation of this section shall constitute a misdemeanor."

H (

It is obvious frorn the rnere reading of the section
that the policy is not void, or the whole prernium would
be returnable, not the excess. This is typical of the
other sections cited by appellants as having been violated. It is the regulation of just such 1natters that the
Insurance Comrnissioner is given authority to supervise.
It is apparent from reading the Insurance Code that
the legislature intended to render insurance policies
valid, if possible, and not invalid for violations of various
sections of the Code. In this connection respondents
call attention to the following sections as typical: 31-1935; 31-19-19; 31-19-18; and 31-19-16.
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Section 31-19-35 provides:
"Any insurance policy, rider or endorsement
hereafter issued and otherwise valid, which contains any condition or provision not in compliance
of the requirements of this code shall not be rendered invalid thereby, but shall be construed and
applied in accordance with such conditions and
provisions as would have applied had such policy,
rider or endorsement been in full compliance with
this code."
Section 31-19-19 provides:
" (1) No insurance contract delivered or
issued for delivery in this state and covering subjects located, resident, or to be performed in this
state, shall contain any condition, stipulation or
agreement (a) requiring it to be construed according to the laws of any other state or country
except as necessary to meet the requirements of
the motor vehicle financial responsibility laws of
such other state or country; or (b) depriving
courts of this state of the jurisdiction of action
against the insurer; or (c) limiting any action
against the insurer * * *.
" ( 2) Any such condition, stipulation, or
agreement shall be void, but such voiding shall
not affect the validity of the other provisions of
the contract."
POINT II.
THE POLI·CIES OF INSURANCE ISSUED TO APPELLANTS WERE NOT V'OID AB INITIO BECAUSE OF WANT
OF MU·TUALITY AND APPELLANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED
TO RETURN OF PREMIUM PAID ON THE GROUND OF
WANT OF MUTUALITY.
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Appellants contend that because the application for
the insurance policies issued to the1n provided that the
insureds agreed to exchange their policies in I)roducers
for policies in Producers Life Insurance Con11Jany after
the fifth anniversary of the policy there was a lack of
1nutuality of obligation between Producers and the appellants, and that because thereof no contract existed between appellants and Producers. Therefore, appellants
contend that said policies were void and appellants are
entitled to a return of their consideration.
The policies do not lack mutuality. For the period
that the premiums were paid Producers furnished protection to appellants, and had any of the appellants died
during said period, the face amount of the policies would
have been paid to their beneficiaries. All of the appellants lapsed their policies by failure to pay premiums
within the five-year period. The only argument that can
be made that there was lack of mutuality would be that
at the expiration of five years the protection would be
furnished by another company rather than Producers.
This agreement constitutes a condition subsequent, that
is, at the expiration of five years the protection was to be
furnished by Producers Life Insurance Company instead
of Producers Mutual upon the irnplied condition that
Producers Life would accept the liability as well as the
premiums to be paid. This Producers Life has not done
and Producers, the respondent, has already agreed to
continue the policies in force, furnishing cash surrender
and non-forfeiture values beyond the five-year period.
These 1natters have been subrnitted to and approved by
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the Insurance Connnissioner of the State of LTtah, and
the cash surrender values and other benefits have been
furnished to all insureds who have continued their policies in force to date. Thus, if there was any want of
1nutuality in the inception of the policies, which Producers does not concede, this rnatter has been rectified
within the five-year period.
However, Producers does not concede that there was
a want of rnutuality during the period from the issuances
of the policies until the fifth year. So long as there
was consideration for the premiums paid, which was
furnished in this case by furnishing protection to the
insureds and by paying dividends each year after the
first year, there is no want of mutuality.
The matter of rnutuality is discussed in 1 Williston
on Contracts 504, Section 141, where the author states:
"It is often stated, as if it were a requisite
in the formation of contracts that there must be
mutuality. This form of statement is likely to
cause confusion and however limited is at best an
unnecessary way of stating that there must be
valid consideration. In unilateral contracts there
is never mutuality of obligation, and in bilateral
agreements though it is necessary that there shall
be such a pron1ise on each side as will furnish sufficient consideration, to express the idea by saying that rnutuality is necessary, is sure to cause
confusion with the use of the same words by
courts of equity. Lack of mutuality, as that
phrase is used by courts of equity, is not necessarily any objection to the existence of a contract
* * *. That particular error which is traceable
to the misleading use of the word 'mutuality' as
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a requiren1ent for the forn1ation of contracts, is a
tendency observable in some cases to hold a contract invalid because the obligation undertaken
upon one side is not commensurate with that
undertaken on the other."
The recent case of N ortohwestern E}ngineering Co. v.
Ellerman, 69 S.D. 397; 10 NW (2d) 879, discusses this
proposition.
The Court in the case of Warner v. Channell Chem.
Co., 121 Wash. 237; 208 Pac. 1104, states:
"Mutuality, as applied to a contract, means
consideration, and, as we have seen, there was
here, expressed in the contract and actually passed by performance, ample consideration for the
optional right to continue. A contract, to be binding, need not be reciprocal as to each and every
distinct covenant contained therein."
The same court in the case of Lloyd v. American
Can Co., 128 Wash. 298; 222 Pac. 876, states the rule as
follows:
~'Any contract containing a consideration is
enforceable, whether it is otherwise mutual or not.
A promise from one party is sufficient to support that from another. Indeed, n1utual promises
are but a certain form of consideration."
The case of Wood & Co. v. Van Deursen, et al., 122
Okla. 19, 250 Pac. 524, is in point. The Court in that case
stated:
" 'A contract does not lack rnutuality because
every obligation is not rnet by an equivalent counter obligation, because, where the act of one depends upon the act of the other, an obligation to
allow the thing necessary for the cornpletion of
the contract is necessarily irnplied.'"
1
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To the san1e effect is the decision of the 1\!xas Supreine C~ourt in the case of Texas Seed & Floral Co . .,.
Chicago Set & Seed Co., 187 S.\,T. 747.
The rule as stated in the next t'vo eases supra is to
the effect that it is iinplied that an obligation necessary
for the cornpletion of the contract will be furnished. In
the case at bar it is necessarily in1plied in the contract
that if Producers Life Insurance Co1npany did not assume the contract at the expiration of the five years, it
would be the responsibility of Producers to do so, and as
above stated Producers has assumed said responsibility,
and under such conditions as is· stated in Wood & Co. v.
Van Deursen, et al., supra, such a contract does not
lack mutuality.
Another case in point is Hartntan v. San Pedro
Commercial Co., 153 Pac. (2d) 212, 66 Cal. App. 935.
POINT III.
APPELLANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO RETURN OF
PREMIUMS PAID WITH INTEREST BECAUSE THE POLICIES ISSUED WERE ULTRA VIRES.

Appellants, as set forth in page 6 of their Brief,
contended in their 1notion to rescind the Coutt's order
of dismissal that the insurance schen1e of Producers was
ultra vires the Insurance Company's Charter. Appellants rnention this 1natter in their Brief, but do not separately set it out as a ground for reversing the order of
the trial court. However, respondents desire to call the
Court's attention to the fact that the contracts of appellants with Producers are now fully executed. Each of the
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appellants lapsed his policy by failure to pay premiurns
as they fell due. During the period of tirne that the policies 'vere in force appellants were protected, and their
beneficiaries would have been paid the face arnount of
their policies in the event of death.
Granted for the sake of argurnent that the contracts
\Vere invalid, the la'v of the rnatter of the return of consideration for an ultra vires contract is stated in 7 Fletcher Cyclopedia, Corporations, 652, Sec. 3497, as follows:
''When an ultra vires contract has been fully
perfor1ned on both sides neither party can nlaintain an action to set aside the transaction or to
recover what has been parted with. In other
words, neither a court of law nor a court of equity
\\rill interfere in such a case to deprive either the
corporation or the other party of rnoney or other
property acquired under the contract. This rule
is well settled."
However, respondent does not concede that the issuance of the policies were ultra vires n1erely because
the Articles of Incorporation of Producers states that
its purpose is to form a rnutual benefit insurance company not for pecuniary profit. The Company was created for the purpose of issuing insurance policies. The
i1nmaterial matters set forth in Appellants' Brief, pages
27 to 33, do not disclose any practice contrary to the
stated purpose of a co1npany to operate not for pecuniary
profit. All insurance companies have expenses and all
insurance companies attempt to accumulate reserves and
surpluses for the protection of their policy holders. This
is all that Producers have done. A true recital of the
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conduct of the business and of the operations of Producers will con1pare favorably with the operatjons of any
other life insurance company of the sa1ne age.
POINT IV.
THE POLICIES ISSUED TO APPELLANTS \\TERE NOT
VOID AB INITIO BECAUSE OF ILLEGALITY OR DISCRIMINATION AND APPELLAN:TS ARE NOT ENTITLED
TO RETURN OF PREMIUMS PAID UPON THE GROUND
THAT SAID POLICIES WERE VOID AB INITIO.

The crux of this case is the matter discussed under
this point.
Appellants contend that, since the insurance was
written in connection with the sale of stock, the sarne
having been prohibited by statute, the contract of insurance is, therefore, void ab initio, and that the premiums
paid are returnable with interest.
All contracts which are prohibited by statute are
not necessarily void. The case of Neil v. Utah Wholesale
Grocery, 210 Pac. 201, 61 Utah 22, follows the general
rule on this subject. The Court in that case, quoting from
Pangborn v. Westlake, 36 Iowa at page 658, states:
" 'There is no doubt that the well settled
general rule is that, when a statute prohibits or
attaches a penalty to the doing of any act, the act
is void and 'vill not be enforced, nor wHl the law
assist one to recover money or property which he
has expended in the unlawful execution of it, or,
in other 'vords, a penalty implies a prohibition,
though there are no prohibitory words in the
statute, and the prohibition makes the act illegal
and void. (Citing cases) But, notwithstanding
this general rule, it must be apparent to every
legal mind that, when a statute annexes a penalty
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for the doing of an act, it does not always imply
such a prohibition, as will render the act void.
Suppose, for instance, the act itself expressly
provided that the penalty annexed should not
have the effect of rendering the act void. Surely
in such case the courts would not give such force
to the legal in1plication, under the general rule
above quoted as to override the express negation
of it in the statute itself. '11hen, upon this conclusion, we are prepared for the next step, which is
equally plain, that if it is 1nanifest fron1 the language of the statute or from its subject-matter
and the plain intent of it, that the act was not to
be made void, but only to punish the person doing
it with the penalty prescribed, it is equally clear
that the courts would readily construe the statute
in accordance with its language and its plain
intent.'"
In the sa1ne case the Court stated :
''The same principle is announced by the Supreme Court of the United States in Harris v.
Runnels, 12 How. 79, 13 L. Ed. 901. The second
and third headnotes to that case are as follows:
" 'Where a statute prohibits an act or annexes
a penalty to its co1nmission, it is true that the act
is made unlawful, but it does not follow that the
unlawfulness of the act \vas 1neant by the Legislature to avoid a contract made in contravention
of it.
" 'Where a statute is silent, and contains
nothing from which the contrary can properly be
inferred, a contract in contravention of it is void.
But the whole statute must be examined in order
to decide whether or not it does contain anything
"froin which the contrary can be properly inferred." ' "
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Respondents again call attention to Sections of the
Insurance Code: 31-19-35; 31-19-19; 31-19-16, and 31-1918, referred to above as typical of the spirit of the Code
and which provide against declaring insuranee policies
void for violations of various provisions of the Code.
The rule is stated in 12 A.J. 6'54 as follows:
"Where a statute prohibits an act or annexes
a penalty for its commission, it does not follow
that the unla,vfulness of the act was meant to
avoid contracts made in contravention of it, but
the whole statute must be examined to discover
whether it intended to prevent courts of justice
from enforcing the forbidden contracts."
In this connection the following cases are in point :

Union Nat. Bank v. Mathews, 98 U.S. 621, 26 L.
Ed. 188;
Union Gold Min. Co. v. Rocky Mountain Nat.
Bank, 96 U.S. 640, 24 L. Ed. 648;
A. C. Frost & Co. v. Gauer d'Alene Mines Corp.,
98 P. (2d) 965, 61 Ida. 21. Reversed in 61 S.
Ct. 414, 312 U.S. 38, 85 L. Ed. 500.
As the court stated in In re Peterson's Estate, 42
N.W. (2d) 59:
"Where the language of a statute is not explicit and admits of construction the courts in determining legislative intent will consider the
occasion and the necessity for the law, mischief
to be remedied, object to be obtained, and consequences of a particular interpretation. Where the
legislature has carefully designated the offense,
offender and the penalty and has made specific
provisions to insure enforcement, the inference is
that the legislature has dealt with the subject com-
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pletely and did not intend in addition thereto that
by 1nere irnplication the drastic consequences of
invalidity should be visited upon the victim of the
offender."
The sections of the statute \vhich appellants contend
\vere violated and \vhich particularly render the insurance policies void for illegality are Sections 31-7-17 and
31-27-15, U.C.A. 1953.
Section 31-7-17 provides, arnong other things, that no
insurance cornpany or any officer or agent thereof shall
give or offer to give as an induce1nent to the purchase of
in~urance any rebate of the premiurn, nor give, sell or
purchase or offer to give, sell or purchase as an inducentent to the purchase of, insurance or in c.onjunction
therewith, any stocks. ~rhe penalty for the violatjon of this
section as set forth therein is that every officer or agent
\vho violates the section is guilty of a rnisdemeanor and it
shall be the duty of the Cornrnissioner upon bejng satisfied that any insurance company or agent has violated
any provisions of this section to revoke the certificate
of authority of the con1pany or agent so offending. Section 31-27-15 provides that no insurer or agent shall, as
an inducement for the purchase of insurance offer to sell
in any manner any shares of stock or other securities.
A'-Jection 31-27-14 provides that no insurer or agent shall,
as an jnducen1ent to purchase insurance, offer, allow or
pay to the insured any rebate. Section 31-27-16' provides
that the Comrnissioner shall revoke the certificate of authority or licenses of any insurer or agent guilty of violating any provision contained in 31-27-14, (on rebates),
and 31-27-15, (on sale of stock in connection \vith insurance).
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Respondent calls the attention of the Court to the
foregoing for the reason that rebating and the sale of
stock in connection with insurance are treated together
in Section 31-7-17; and Section 31-27-15 (on sale of stock),
and Section 31-27-14 (on rebating), have the same
penalties for violation as set forth in Section 31-27-16.
Since the two subj-ects - sale of stock with policies
and rebating are covered by the same and consecutive
sections, and the san1e penalties provided for the violation of each, respondents submit that the authorities upon the subject of rebating are pertinent in considering
the matter of sale of stock with policies.
Counsel has been unable to find any cases directly
passing upon the question of whether or not a policy
sold in connection with stock is void. However, the cases
are numerous on the matter of rebating and the effect
of rebating on the insurance sold in connection therewith.
The law in connection with this matter is stated in
44 C.J.S. 1310, Section 342, as follows:
"Ordinarily the effect of making a discrimination or rebate in connection with insurance premiums in violation of statutes condemning such
practice is to subject the guilty agent or insurance
company to a penalty of criminal punishment as
discussed supra and to invalidate the discriminatory agreement or contract for rebate and a note
or check given in connection therewith but not to
invalidate the insurance policy." (Italics ours)
Cases cited in footnote 38 on page 1311, 44 C.J.S., include
among others :
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Meridian Life Ins. Co. r. Dean) G2 So. 90, 182
Ala. 127;
Pyramid Life Ins. Co. v ..Patton) 110 S.W. (2d)
526, 194 Ark. 987 ;
.r1rnerican Nat. Ins. Co. 'U. Brrown) 201 S.W. 326,
179 Ky. 711;
Landau v. N.Y. Life Ins. Cu.) 203 S.W. 1003, 199
Mo. App. 544; and
Ashton Jenkins Ins. Co. v. Layton Sugar Co.)
39 P. (2d) 701, 85 Utah 333.

In Ashton Jenkins Ins. Co. v. Layton Su,gar Co.)
supra, the court said:
"The agree1nent to pay at the 42-cent rate did
not render the contract void. The statute provides
a penalty for an insurance co1npany, its officers
or agents, violating any of the provisions of the
act. It was not conte1nplated by the statute that
the insurance company could enter into such an
agree1nent and then take advantage of it by saying that the agree1nent was void. Whether or not
the plaintiff violated the statute we are not called
upon to decide. It is clear fron1 the evidence that
the assured was not involved or affected by any
guilt of plaintiff. Certainly, if plaintiff were
guilty of violating the statute this court would not
permit it to set up its own guilt or wrong to enrich itself."
The court then cites several cases, the first of which
is Way 1:. Pac. Lbr. & Timber Co.) 74 Wash. 332, 133 P.
595. The following citation fron1 this case is in point:
"Plaintiff's error lies in the assun1ption that
the contract between the co-partnership and the
defendant was void, whereas, the rule is that a
contract which violates . a statutory regulation
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of business is not void unless 1nade so by the
terms of the act. 'It is a general proposition sustained by the weight of authority that where a
statute imposes a penalty for failure to comply
with statutory requirements, the penalty so provided is exclusive of any other.' LaFrance Fire
Engine Co. v. Mt. Vernon, 9 Wash. 142, 37 P. 287,
38 P. 80; Horrell v. Cal. etc. Ass'n, 40 Wash. 531,
82 P. 889. The statute strikes no blow at the business of insurance, neither does it assun1e to void
contracts. Its purpose is to regulate, not to prohibit.
" 'vVhen a statute is * * * a regulation of a
traffic or business, and not to prohibit it altogether, whether a contract which violates the
statute shall be treated as wholly void, will depend on the intention expressed in the particular statute. Unless the contrary intention is manifest the contract will be valid.' Sutherland Statutory Construction, Sec. 366."
Probably the leading case on this rnatter is the case
of Laun v. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 111 N.W. 660, 131 Wis.
555. The whole opinion is worthy of being quoted. One
citation from this case reads :
"We must hold that, considering the subjectmatter of this legislation, the relations of other
non-offending policy holders to the corporation
and its funds, the feature of the statute permitting
rebates if written in the policy and the particular
consequences pre·scribed by the statute for its violation falling only upon one of the parties to the
prohibited transaction, the contract of insurance
itself is neither illegal nor invalid and that the
plaintiff received in consideration of his premiums paid from the Conservative Life Insurance
Con1pany a valid policy of life insurance and that
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he consequently cannot reeover back his prerniums
or any part thereof."
In this case, Laun v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co.,
the Court stated that since the cornpany wa8 a mutual
insurance company, any refund of premiun1 paid to
plaintiff who had received his protection for son1e years
would by so rnuch dilninish the interest of the other nonoffending policy holders in the assets of the corporation.
This is the rnatter referred to in the citation above "considering * * * the relations of other non-offending policy
holders to the corporation and its funds."
This is a rnatter of great in1portance in the case at
bar. If appellants are successful in recovering back all
premiums paid "\vith interest, there is no doubt that
· numerous other policy holders who have, during the past
five years lapsed their policies and possibly so1ne of the
present policy holders whose insurance is still in force,
will attempt to recover all premiun1s paid with interest.
Approxirnately twenty rnillion dollars of insurance was
written in connection with the sale of stock. There is yet
in force approxiruately nine 1nillion dollars of such insurance owned by approximately 1800 policy holders.
The total insurance in force in the con1pany is now approxirnately seventeen rnillion dollars, and Producers
has approxirnately 4000 policy holders. Thus, if a considerable percentage of those who have purchased
Founders Policies were to recover back all premiurn~
paid it would result in great injustice to policy holders
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who have kept their insurance in force.
The following quotation is fro1n Anterican Nat. Ins.
Co. v. Brown, 201 S.W. 326, 179 I-cy. 711:
"Insurance companies are engaged in a public business and upon grounds of public policy
insurance contracts that may, in preli1ninary verbal arrangements between soliciting agent and the
insured, have been tainted with the vice of rebating should, when fully executed and reduced
to writing be held valid as between the insured
and the insurance company neither of them being
allowed to defeat the contract in any part upon
the ground that it was secured in the manner
stated in violation of the statute. (Citing cases)"
In the case of Douglas v. Mutual Benefit 1-Iealth and
Accident Assn., 76 Pac. (2d) 453, 42 N.M. 190, the following headnotes reflect the decision of the Court:
"Headnote 16. One of the objects of the insurance statute is to prevent splitting of commissions with insured or someone else who may
assist agent, but it was not intended that insurance contract made in its violation should be invalid.
"Headnote 17. The statutes prohibiting issuance of insurance policies until schedules of rates
and forms have been filed with the Superintend~nt of Insurance, prohibiting variations from
published rates, and requiring written policies,
do not invalidate oral insurance contracts."
t-fhus, it appears by the cases, including the case of
Ashton Jenkins Ins. Co. v. Layton Sugar Company,
supra, from our own court, that a policy written in violation of the statute against rebates, does not render the
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policy invalid, and as heretofore pointed out the statute
on rebating and the statute on selling stock with insurance were written together and apparently the sante
penalty was intended to be imposed in both instances.
The respondent 1nakes no clain1 that the Trust
Agreement, under "\vhich dividends were accumulated
to be used for the purchase of stock, is not illegal and
void. At the hearing of this rnatter in the trial court
respondent admitted that the Trust Agreen1ent for the
accumulation of funds for the purchase of stock was invalid, and that plaintiffs were entitled to the return of
dividends so used for the purchase of stock. Respondent
tendered checks to appellants in the a1nounts of such
dividends and requested the stock in exchange therefor.
Appellants refused to deliver the stock in exehange for
the checks. r~rhe checks and the stock are now filed in
this case and respondent stands ready at any time to
return to appellants, or any other purchasers of stock,
the amounts so paid to them and applied on the purchase
of the stock upon the condition only that the stock so
purchased be returned to the Company.
Appellants are not entitled to the return of their
premiums. The policies are not void. Producers has
carried protection upon its policy holders to the amount
of millions of dollars of insurance, and has paid claims
upon said insurance totaling approximately $4-2,000.00 to
the end of 1954. The Company has never denied the
validity of said insurance or attempted to defeat any
claim thereon.
Upon the question of return of prerniu1ns the law
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is stated in 44 C.J.S. 1394, Section 407, as follows:
"The general rule is that insured can recover
premiums paid by him, if, without fault on his
part, the risk has never attached since in such
case the company has furnished no consideration
for the premium.
"Insured is , entitled to a return of the premium paid where, without fault or fraud on his
part, no risk has attached and the co1npany has
been subjected to no liability, as where no binding contract of insurance was effected or the
policy was void ab initio, since in such cases there
has been no consideration for the payment of the
premiums."
406)

The rule is also stated in 44 C.J.S. 1389, Section
as follows :
"The general rule, in the absence of statutory
or contract provision to the contrary, is that there
can be no return of premium once the risk has attached and benefit has been derived from the contract since in such cases the premium is considered earned."

On this subject, appellants, at page 42 of their Brief,
quote from 3 Couch on Insurance, 2353, Section 710, as
follo,vs:
"6. A policy of insurance may be void ab
initio * * * for illegality, the parties not being in
pari delecto ; * * * in all such cases the premium
is returnable * * *. It has also been said that if
the policy is invalid and the insured was guilty of
no fraud in procuring it, the premium is returnable."
The full quotation is as follows :
"A policy of insurance may be void ab initio
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and the risk never attached, there being no fault
of the insured as in case of breach of warranty,
whereby no liability is ever incurred by the insurer; or there may be an entire want of interest;
or the policy may be void for illegality, the parties
not being in pari delecto, or it may be void ab
initio by some act or omission of the insurer - in
all of which cases the premium is returnable."
A reading of the cases given as the footnote to the above
citation from 3 Couch 2353, Section 710, will disclose that
every such case involves a situation in which no risk ever
attached to the insurance company.
The following is a quotation from 3 Couch 2353, Section 709, the section preceding the one from which appellants quote in part. That section reads :
"In the absence of statutory or contract provision to the contrary if a legal risk has once attached or commenced there can be no apportionment or return afterward of the premiurn so far
as a particular risk is concerned. And diminution
in its duration has no effect to decrease the
amount stipulated as the premiurn or price for
renewing the risk, but it is sufficient to preclude
a return that the insurer has been liable for any
period, however short."
Two companion cases from Kansas are directly
in point. These cases are: Olson v. Western Automobile
Ins. Co., 115 Kan. 227, 222 Pac. 104, and Walters v.
Western Automobile Ins. Co., 116 Kan. 40-t, 226 Pac. 746.
The defendant, a mutual automobile liability insurance company, had issued policies of insurance to the
rnembers of a club known as the Inter-Insurance Ex-
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change of Chicago, Illinois, "'\vith 1nore coverage and for
less pren1ium than to its other policy holders, and had
not had its policy approved by the Insurance Superintendent of Kansas in violation of the statutes. The Insurance Superintendent ordered defendant to cancel all
policies issued to Inter-Insurance Exchange club members. In the first case cited the Court said:
"Therefore, doing business by use of a policy
not approved by the Superintendent of Insurance
is doing business without authority and contrary
to law. The Superintendent of Insurance had not
approved the form of policy issued to members
of the automobile club, and his direction to cancel
had back of it the common sanction of revocation
of the company's certificate of authority to transact business."
In the second case, the plaintiff brought the action
to recover all premiums paid by him on the ground that
the policies were illegal and void and had afforded him
no protection. Judgment was rendered in the trial court
in favor of defendant, the Court declaring the policies
to have been based upon a valid consideration and plaintiff appealed.
The Supre1ne Court affirmed the trial court and
said:
"In the opinion (Olson v. Western Automobile Ins. Co.) it was said that the policies were
unlawful and that doing business by use of such
policies was doing business without authority and
contrary to law, pages 230, 231. The plaintiff in
the present case relies upon the language as supporting his contention that the policies afforded
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no consideration for the money paid for the1n and
therefore that he is entitled to its return. * * *.
"* * * The Court did not decide, did not say,
and did not intend to suggest, that the policies
so long as they remained outstanding were void
or unenforceable. Throughout the opinion the
fact that before the cancellation of the policies
their holders were members of the company was
fully recognized. The terms 'unlawful' as applied
to the policies, and 'contrary to law' as applied
to the doing of business by means of such policies,
are to be interpreted in the light of the facts of
the case in which they were used. The conduct
was merely irregular, rather than illegal in such
a sense as to render the result void. The policies
held by the plaintiff were valid contracts as between him and the company until they were cancelled. Had a loss occurred, the company could
have been compelled to pay. The earned portion
of the premium belongs to the company in return
for the protection afforded, which constituted a
valuable consideration for the pay1nent."
Appellants submit that the great a1nount of insurance written by Producers has been in force at all times
that the policy holders have paid the preinimus thereon.
Under the law the risk having attached there can be no
return of the premiurn. Respondents subn1it that it has
not been the intention of the legislature to invalidate
insurance because it was written in connection with a
rebate or in connection with the sale of stock. The insurance business is one to be protected, fostered and encouraged by the courts, and to accomplish this purpose
the laws regulating insurance have been written.
Appellants complain that the Commissioner did not
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invoke the penalty provided in Section 31-7-17, against
Producers, that is, the revocation of Producers' License.
This Court commented upon the 1natter of the revocation of Producers' license by the Comntissioner of
Insurance in its decision in 271 Pac. (2d) 844, 2 Utah
(2d) 205, as follows:
"The fact that the insurance corn1nissioner
has allowed these companies to engage in the sale
of stock with insurance policies for nearly two
years might mitigate against the imposition of the
penalty if the commission sought to exact it but
cannot control in the interpretation of the statute."
The following quotation from Utah Association of
Life Underwriters v. Mountain States Life Ins. Co., 58
Utah 579, 200 Pac. 673, supports the position of the trial
court that most of the n1atters set forth in plaintiffs'
complaint are matters for the Insurance Commissioner.
In that case, Judge Frick, speaking for the court, said:
"While there are other objections raised by
plaintiff's counsel, yet those all relate to the relationship of the company with the Mountain States
Service Company and a trust con1pany, and thus
come within the jurisdiction of the commissioner
and not within the jurisdiction of this eourt. If
such relationship militate against the stability or
welfare of the company or against the best interests of its policy holders the commissioner, and
not the courts, must correct the evil. He is given
ample power to do so."
It is interesting to note that in that case the court
revoked the license of the defendant insurance company,
~fountain States Life Ins. Co., as the appellants complain
that the Commissioner should have done in the case at
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bar, but which he failed to do. ·However, on re-hearing
Judge Frick stated :
"There is Inerit in counsel's request that the
judgment of the court be modified. As the judgInent now stands the license or per1nit of the company to transact business in this state is unconditionally annulled and set aside without giving
it any opportunity to co1nply with the provisions
of our statutes and the further order of the coinmissioner. The judgment is, therefore, too sweeping. The judgment should be and the same is
hereby modified as follows :
"That the order of the co1nmissioner granting
the company a license or permit to transact the
business of life insurance in this state is set aside
and annulled; provided, however, that the company is hereby granted leave to apply to the commissioner under its original application for a license or permit to transact the business aforesaid
in this state in case it shall comply with the provisions of our statute and \vith the conditions
imposed in this opinion and with the lawful orders
of the commissioner."
The law under which the decision was rendered in
[Jtah Association of Life [Jnderwriters v. Mountain
States Life Ins. Co., supra, provided that the license of
the co1npany should be revoked for violation of the provision prohibiting the sale of stock with life insurance.
As soon as the Supreme Court rendered its decision in
the case involving Producers, Producers inunediately
discontinued the sale of stock. Pursuant to the ruling
of the court in Utah Association of Life Underwriters v.
111 ountain States Insurance Co., there is no reason why
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the Connnissioner should invoke his power to revoke the
license of Producers, and as before 1nentioned this Court
in the recent case involving Producers indicated that,
considering the fact that for two years the company had
operated under a license from the Con1missioner, it
would mitigate against his revoking the license of Producers.
From the statutes in question and the rulings of the
Court, it appears that this Court has not intended to
prevent the writing of insurance, but to regulate it in
accordance with the provisions of the statute.
CONCLUSION
Respondents respectfully submit that the decision of
the trial court was correct and that the appeal of appellants should be dismissed.
Respectfully submitted,

J. GRANT IVERSON,
Attorney for Respondents,
627 Continental Bank Building,
Salt Lake City 1, Utah
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